Attorneys\u27 Fees Awards to Contract Nonsignatories: Should Equitable Estoppel Inform the Discretion of the Courts? by Ginger, Stephen R.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 1 Article 2
January 2009
Attorneys' Fees Awards to Contract
Nonsignatories: Should Equitable Estoppel Inform
the Discretion of the Courts?
Stephen R. Ginger
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen R. Ginger, Attorneys' Fees Awards to Contract Nonsignatories: Should Equitable Estoppel Inform the Discretion of the Courts?, 40
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2009).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol40/iss1/2
ARTICLE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS TO 
CONTRACT NONSIGNATORIES: 
SHOULD EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
INFORM THE DISCRETION OF THE 
COURTS? 
STEPHEN R. GINGER· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than two hundred years ago, the United States 
Supreme Court established the "American Rule" of attorneys' 
fees in civil cases, which provides that a party to a lawsuit 
must bear the expense of his or her own attorneys.l Since that 
time, several exceptions to the American Rule have been 
created by the courts and legislatures. Probably the most 
frequently employed exception is the "contractual" exception, in 
which the parties to a contract allocate the risk of loss arising 
from actions to enforce the contract by imposing an obligation 
• General Counsel, Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., Mobile, Alabama 2003-
present; Partner, Condon & Forsyth LLP, Los Angeles, California 1992-2003; 
Associate Attorney, Condon & Forsyth LLP, 1984-1992; Law Clerk to Honorable Albert 
Lee Stephens, Jr., United States District Court, Central District of California, 1982-
1984; J.D., Southwestern University School of Law, 1982 (cum laude); admitted to the 
State Bar of California, 1982. The author was trial and appellate counsel in First 
Republic Bank v. Kim, No. BC035695 (L.A. Super. Ct.), afI'd, No. B103416 (Cal. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished), in which an award of attorneys' fees to a contract 
nonsignatory based on the doctrine of estoppel was upheld on appeal. The views 
expressed in this article are the author's own. 
1 See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). 
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on the losing party to pay the prevailing party's attorneys' 
fees. 2 The use of contractual fee-shifting provisions has become 
so widespread that, in the modern world of commercial 
transactions, it is virtually impossible to find a contract that 
does not contain an attorneys' fees provision. 
Attorneys' fees provisions, which have their roots in 
notions of equity and fairness, also have another salutary, 
although perhaps unintended, effect. In light ofthe substantial 
costs of litigating commercial disputes in the courts, and the 
uncertainty of a favorable result, the very existence of an 
attorneys' fees provision in a contract can operate as a "nuclear 
deterrent" that forces the parties to settle their dispute without 
invoking the judicial process. The typical boilerplate attorneys' 
fees provision, to which almost no attention is paid in the 
drafting process, can have a significant effect on the parties' 
actions after a contractual dispute arises. 
Cost considerations, which force the parties to negotiate 
instead oflitigate, may not be readily apparent when one of the 
parties seeks to impose contractual liability on an individual or 
entity who is not a signatory to the contract. The attempt to 
impose such liability takes a variety of forms, and the 
imagination of counsel appears to be the only limitation on the 
initiation of these types of actions.3 However, there is great 
potential for an action against a non signatory to backfire in the 
event of an adverse judgment, either on a pretrial ruling by the 
court or after a trial. California law provides that a 
non signatory to a contract who successfully defends an action 
may, under certain circumstances, recover his or her attorneys' 
fees when sued on a contract as if he or she were a party to it.4 
Although the attorneys' fees issue may escape the notice of the 
litigants during the course of the litigation, the entry of 
judgment by the court, with its provision for costs to the 
prevailing party, usually precipitates an attorneys' fees 
motion.5 
The rule of law granting nonsignatories attorneys' fees 
seems on its face anomalous. If a person is not a party to a 
2 See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 599 P.2d 83, 85 (Cal. 1979). 
3 Some of the more popular theories of liability gleaned from the cases include 
alter ego, Arnold v. Browne, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1972), and joint venture, 
Babcock v. Omansky, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512 (Ct. App. 1973). 
4 See CAL. Cry. CODE § 1717(a) (West 2009). 
5 See CAL. RULES OF CT. 3.1702. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol40/iss1/2
2009] AITORNEYS' FEES A WARDS 17 
contract, and is not deemed a third party beneficiary, how can 
he or she be entitled to the benefit of one of the contract's 
provisions? Moreover, in interpreting a contract, the court's 
primary function is to ascertain the intent of the parties.6 How 
can the court know what the contracting parties intended when 
the party asserting the right to attorneys' fees was not a 
signatory to the contract? 
Although the cases have clearly established the right of 
nonsignatories to recover their attorneys' fees, there is 
considerable confusion in the courts as to the foundation on 
which this right exists. In the early cases, it was thought that 
the right emanated from the doctrine of estoppe1.7 Early 
estoppel cases reasoned that if a party pursues a contract 
action against a nonsignatory, forcing the nonsignatory to 
defend the action, the party initiating the action should be 
estopped from later denying that the non signatory is not a 
party to the contract for purposes of an award of attorneys' 
fees. s 
Thereafter, in a series of cases first adopting the doctrine 
of estoppel, then discarding it, and then recognizing its validity 
again, the courts have shown a sensational inability to 
formulate a coherent doctrine to inform the decision as to when 
a non signatory will be awarded fees and when they will be 
denied. While some courts continue to recogniL.:e the doctrine of 
estoppel as the basis on which fee awards to nonsignatories 
should be made, other courts require a showing that, as a 
matter of law, the losing party could have actually recovered a 
fee award against the nonsignatory, assuming the loser had 
prevailed on the merits of the lawsuit. This latter approach is 
manifestly unfair and imposes a substantial and unjustified 
financial burden on the nonsignatory. 
This Article argues that, although the doctrine of estoppel 
has fallen into disrepute in recent cases, it is still the fairest 
and most equitable basis on which to adjudicate the right to 
attorneys' fees in non signatory cases. Part II puts the problem 
of nonsignatory recovery of attorneys' fees in historical context 
by examining the roots and rationale of the "American Rule" of 
6 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 
641 (Cal. 1968); Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988). 
7 See inJIa notes 44-64 and accompanying text. 
sId. 
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attorneys' fees. Part III describes section 1717 of the California 
Civil Code and case law interpretation of that section. Part IV 
will trace the development of the doctrine permitting recovery 
of attorneys' fees by non signatories to a contract through 
California case law and identify the basis that courts rely on to 
grant or deny such recovery. Part V provides an explication of 
the erroneously decided case of Leach v. Home Savings & Loan 
Assn, and Part VI explains the judicial response to Leach and 
the confusion it created. In Parts V and VI, the steady erosion 
of the doctrine of estoppel is analyzed in the post-Leach era, 
and an argument is presented as to why this trend should be 
reversed. 
II. THE "AMERICAN RULE" AND THE EQUITABLE IMPULSE TO 
GRANT FEES 
In determining whether attorneys' fees may be awarded in 
a civil case, most courts follow the so-called "American Rule," 
which generally provides that "each party must pay his own 
attorney fees."g The "American Rule" received its name as a 
means to distinguish it from the longstanding practice English 
courts used to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in 
civil lawsuits. 10 The Statute of Gloucester, enacted in 1278, 
allowed a successful plaintiff the "costs of his writ purchased."ll 
These costs were "from the outset liberally construed to 
encompass all legal costs of suit, including counsel fees.,,12 
Subsequently, in the seventeenth century, the English courts 
expanded the rule to cover prevailing defendants as well as 
I . t·ff: 13 pam 1 s. 
The early English cases in which attorneys' fees were 
9 Gray v. Don Miller & Assocs., Inc., 674 P.2d 253, 256 (Cal. 1984); see also 
Santisas v. Goodin, 951 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1998). The American Rule has been codified by 
the California Legislature in section 1021 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 
which states that each party is to bear his own attorneys' fees unless such an award is 
permitted by statute or contract. See CAL. eIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (Westlaw 2009). 
10 See Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); 
see also Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 704-06 
(1940). 
11 Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c 1; see also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 597 (2d ed. 1898); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 
363, 372 (1851). 
12 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717, n.7 
(1967) (citing Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849,852 (1929)). 
13 Statute of Westminster, 1607, 4 Jac. 1, c 3; Goodhart, supra note 12, at 851-54. 
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awarded generally fell into three categories: (1) where 
allegations of fraud and misconduct were made but not proven; 
(2) where the gravamen of the lawsuit was false, unjust, 
vexatious, wanton, or oppressive; and (3) where a fiduciary 
relation existed, such as trustee and trustor, pledgor and 
pledgee, or principal and agent, and the fiduciary was put to 
expense in defending an unfounded suit or in protecting the 
trust property.14 An award of fees by an English court of equity 
was entirely discretionary and made "solely according to the 
conscience of the court" when "the justice of the case might so 
require.,,15 It is clear that deterrence of frivolous or unfounded 
lawsuits, in addition to the sense of fairness expressed by 
compensating the aggrieved party, was a major objective of the 
English rule on attorneys' fees. 16 
The courts of colonial America largely adopted this English 
practice of awarding attorneys' fees in civil litigation.17 
However, by the time of the ratification of the United States 
Constitution, the states had begun to regulate fee awards by 
establishing schedules to be applied by the courts. IS These 
early state fee schedules failed to keep pace with inflation and 
became so outdated that they were, as one commentator 
characterized them, "in the arrested development stage" with 
the fees "entirely inadequate and trivial.,,19 Unlike state courts, 
federal courts made fee awards based on their "inherent 
power," which they believed had been inherited from the 
English courts. 20 However, they borrowed the state schedules 
to guide them in the amounts awarded.21 
As a result, "the statutorily awarded fees soon became 
little more than nominal awards,'>22 and in 1796 the United 
States Supreme Court established the "American Rule" in the 
[4 See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 
1928). 
[5 Id. at 240. 
[6 See generally MARY FRANCES DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES, § 1.02 (1985). 
[7 The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377 (1869). 
[8 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 16, § 1.02. 
[9 Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an 
Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619,626 (1931). 
20 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 16, § 1.02. 
21 Id. 
22 Id., § 1.02 n.12. 
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case of Arcambel v. Wiseman.23 In Arcambel, the Court struck 
an attorneys' fees award in an admiralty case, holding that the 
"general practice ofthe United States is in opposition to it.,,24 
The response to Arcambel has not been favorable, and 
several exceptions to the rule have been created and expanded 
by the courts and legislatures.25 Exceptions - such as private-
attorney-general, substantial-benefit, common-fund, and bad-
faith exceptions - were created by the "equitable impulse" of 
the courts, "fueled by a desire to make the prevailing party 
whole, by a perceived unfairness in requiring the prevailing 
party to shoulder the expenses of litigation in a particular case 
,,26 Because of this, some of these exceptions have not 
survived the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. 27 Although the 
American Rule appears to be in no danger of repudiation by the 
Supreme Court,28 the exceptions to the rule, whether common-
law or statutory, seem to remain firmly rooted in the 
"conscience" of the English courts of equity. 
III. SECTION 1717 OF THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 
One of the most widely employed exceptions to the 
23 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). 
24 Id. 
25 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 16, § 1.03. See also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 60-71 (1935); Albert A. Ehrenzwieg, 
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966); 
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. 
L. REV. 636, 637 (1974); William B. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A 
Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202, 206-07 (1966). 
The fIrst formal attack on the American Rule was issued by the Massachusetts 
Judicial Council in 1925. See First Report of the Judicial Council of 
Massachusetts, 11 MAss. L. Q. 63-64 (1925). The Council stated in its report: 
On what principle of justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public 
highway recover his doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill? And on what 
principle of justice is a defendant who has been wrongfully haled into court 
made to payout of his own pocket the expense of showing that he was 
wrongfully sued? 
26 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 16, § 1.03. 
27 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) 
(trademark exception disallowed); see also Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness 
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 241 (1975). 
28 "The Supreme Court has consistently felt that it is the function of Congress, 
not the federal courts, to determine when property (in the nature of attorneys fees) 
should involuntarily be taken from one party and given to another." DERFNER & WOLF, 
supra note 16, § 1.03 n.21. 
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American Rule of attorneys' fees is the "contractual" exception. 
Under this exception, parties to an agreement may allocate the 
risk of an adverse judgment in a legal dispute by requiring the 
losing party to pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing party.29 
If a contract makes an award of attorneys' fees available to 
only one party, section 1717 of the California Civil Code makes 
the right a reciprocal one.30 Section 1717 was enacted in 1968 
to ensure mutuality of remedy for attorneys' fee claims and to 
prevent "'oppressive use of one-sided attorney's fees 
provisions."'31 As originally drafted, section 1717 provided in 
pertinent part as follows: 
In any action on a contract, where such contract specifically 
provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to 
enforce the provisions of such contract, shall be awarded to 
one of the parties, the prevailing party, whether he is the 
party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees in addition to costs and necessary 
disbursements.32 
The provision was "designed to enable consumers and 
others who may be in a disadvantageous contractual 
bargaining position to protect their rights through the judicial 
process by permitting recovery of attorney's fees incurred in 
litigation in the event they prevail.,,33 
29 See Robert S. Miller, Attorneys' Fees for Contractual Non-Signatories Under 
California Civil Code Section 1717: A Remedy in Search ofa Rationale, 32 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 535, 543 (1995). 
30 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 599 P.2d 83, 85 (Cal. 1979); Int'l Indus., Inc. 
v. Olen, 577 P.2d 1031 (Cal. 1978); Xuereb v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
154, 156-57 (Ct. App. 1992); Sys. Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank, 98 Cal. Rptr. 735, 752 (Ct. 
App. 1971) (quoting Review of Selected 1968 Code Legislation (Cont. Ed. Bar) pp. 35-
36). 
31 Santisas v. Goodin, 951 P.2d 399, 416 (Cal. 1998) (Baster, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (quoting Hsu v. Abbara, 891 P.2d 804, 809 (Cal. 1995)); see PLCM Group v. 
Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084 (2000); Reynolds, 599 P.2d at 85 (citing Coast Bank v. 
Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39-40 (Ct. App. 1971); Sears v. Baccaglio, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
769, 775 (Ct. App. 1998); see also James D. Acoba, Recovery of Attorney's Fees in 
Actions to Enforce Contracts: California Civil Code Section 1717, 12 W. ST. U. L. REV. 
751 (1985). 
32 Santisas, 951 P.2d at 416 (Baster, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Cal. 
Stats. 1968, ch. 266, § 1, p. 578) (emphasis added). 
33 Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39 n.3 (Ct. App. 1971); see also 
Legislative Counsel's Enrolled Bill Mem. on Assem. Bill No. 563 (1968 Reg. Sess.) 
prepared for Governor Reagan (June 5, 1968), p. 1 ("The bill is intended to protect 
persons of limited means who sign contracts with those in a superior bargaining 
7
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Initially, the courts reached contradictory conclusions on 
whether section 1717 applies to nonsignatories. The first case 
to apply section 1717 to a claim for attorneys' fees by a 
non signatory to a contract was Arnold v. Browne.34 In Arnold, 
plaintiffs were individual shareholders of a corporation who 
entered into a stock-purchase agreement with the members of 
a general partnership.35 The stock-purchase agreement 
required that the partnership assume the form of a corporation 
and issue a promissory note to the shareholders for the 
purchase price of the stock, secured by a stock pledge and a 
chattel mortgage.36 Although the partnership was incorporated 
as required by the stock-purchase agreement, it subsequently 
went bankrupt and defaulted on the promissory note.37 The 
shareholders sued the corporation for breach of the promissory 
note.3S They also sued the principals of the corporation on a 
theory of alter ego liability to hold them personally liable for 
the promissory-note debt.39 The shareholders obtained a 
default judgment against the bankrupt corporation.40 However, 
the individual defendants prevailed at trial, with the court 
finding that the elements of alter ego liability had not been 
proven.41 The defendants made a motion for attorneys' fees 
based on a fee provision contained in the promissory note, 
which was denied by the trial court.42 The First District Court 
of Appeal affirmed, holding simply that under section 1717, 
"the individual defendants were not entitled to attorneys' fees, 
as they were not 'parties' to the contract.'>43 
A year later, the Second District Court of Appeal reached 
position."); see also Moallem v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
253,256 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Sys. Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank, 98 Cal. Rptr. 735,752 
(1971) (stating that the purpose of section 1717 was to advance "the policy of the state 
to protect the unequal bargaining power of the 'little man' in contracts of adhesion")). 
34 Arnold v. Browne, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1972). For a discussion of the 
early judicial response to section 1717, see Miller, supra note 29, at 548-553; Saxon, 
Recovery of Attorneys Fees by the Non-Contracting Defendant, 55 CAL. STATE BAR J. 
150 (1980). 
35 Arnold, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 I d. 
39 I d. 
40 I d. 
41 Arnold, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79. 
42 I d. 
43 Id. 
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the opposite conclusion in Babcock v. Omansky.44 Babcock 
involved an action for breach of promissory notes signed by one 
of the defendants. 45 One of the numerous causes of action 
pleaded by plaintiff alleged that defendant's wife was also 
liable on the promissory notes on the ground that she acted as 
a co-venturer and agent of defendant.46 The promissory notes 
contained a standard attorneys' fees provision.47 
The trial court granted a nonsuit in favor of defendant's 
wife but denied her request for attorneys' fees pursuant to 
section 1717, holding that defendant's wife was not a prevailing 
party because she was found liable for fraud on another cause 
of action.48 
The court of appeal reversed. 49 The court construed the 
language of section 1717 and held that 
[a]s the language of the statute expressly indicates, a party 
need not be a signatory to the contract in order to recover 
attorney's fees as the prevailing party - as such prevailing 
party he becomes entitled to fees "whether he is the party 
specified in the contract or not.',5Q 
The Babcock court noted that plaintiff clearly pleaded a 
cause of action against defendant's wife for breach of the 
promissory notes, and that "having won an order of nonsuit as 
to this tenth cause of action, [defendant] was the 'prevailing 
party' and entitled to attorney's fees under section 1717."51 The 
Babcock court rejected plaintiffs argument that defendant 
could not be the prevailing party for purposes of an attorneys' 
fees award because she had been found liable for fraud, holding 
that the fraud cause of action was ex delicto, not ex contractu.52 
In 1976, the Fourth District Court of Appeal cited Babcock 
44 Babcock v. Omansky, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512, 518-19 (Ct. App. 1973). 
45 I d. 
46 I d. 
47 Id. 
48 I d. 
49 I d. 
50 Babcock, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19; see also Brosso v. Running Springs Country 
Club, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 758, 768 (Ct. App. 1991); Manier v. Anaheim Bus. Ctr. Co., 
207 Cal. Rptr. 508, 510 (Ct. App. 1984); Jones v. Drain, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830 (Ct. 
App.1983). 
51 Babcock, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 518. 
52 Id. 
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with approval in Care Construction, Inc. v. Century 
Convalescent Centers, Inc.,53 in which an attorneys' fees award 
was upheld in favor of a defendant who successfully defended a 
contract action on the ground that the contract was 
unenforceable. 54 However, only two years later, the Fourth 
District repudiated Babcock in Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. 
v. WJlkoski 55 Canal-Randolph was an unlawful detainer action 
against an attorney who had assumed office space in plaintiffs 
building without signing a lease. 56 After a bench trial, the trial 
court entered a judgment for defendant, finding plaintiffs 
three-day notice to pay rent or quit defective.57 The trial court 
made an award of attorneys' fees to defendant under the lease, 
and plaintiff appealed. 58 
On appeal, the Canal-Randolph court reversed, holding 
that the trial court's findings were insufficient to support the 
judgment. 59 The court took the position that, as a matter of 
law, no attorneys' fees could be recovered by defendant, 
because defendant was not a party to the lease agreement.60 
The court rejected defendant's argument that section 1717 
provided the trial court with authority for the attorneys' fees 
award, on the ground that under section 1717, "recovery of and 
liability for attorney fees is restricted to parties to the 
contract.,,61 Ignoring the plain language of section 1717, the 
Canal-Randolph court, in a tour de fOrce of tortured statutory 
construction, asserted that 
[t]he introductory clause [of section 1717] sets forth the 
predicate for applicability of the section, to wit, a contract 
providing for recovery of attorney fees by only one of the 
parties to the contract. The language "the party specified in 
the contract" refers to the party to the contract authorized by 
the terms of the contract to recover attorney fees should he 
53 Care Constr., Inc. v. Century Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 761 (Ct. 
App.1976). 
54 Id. at 762. 
55 Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski, 144 Cal. Rptr. 474 (Ct. App. 1978). 
56 I d. at 475-76. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 476. The action was remanded back to the trial court with directions to 
make specific fmdings on all of the issues raised by the parties. Id. 
60 Id. at 475-76. 
61 I d. at 476. 
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prevail. "[T]he prevailing party, whether he is the party 
specified in the contract or not" means the prevailing party, 
whether or not he is the party authorized by the terms of the 
contract to recover attorneys fees should he prevail. In 
either case, the reference is to the party to the contract who 
prevails. It was the purpose of the statute to make 
unilateral attorney fee provisions in a contract reciprocal, not 
to extend the benefit of a contractual provision for the 
recovery of attorney fees to a person not a party to the 
contract.62 
25 
The hostility of the Canal-Randolph court to the notion of 
awarding attorneys' fees to a non signatory was manifestly 
expressed by its summary dismissal of defendant's equitable 
argument.63 As for Babcock, the Canal-Randolph court bluntly 
concluded that it was erroneously decided, and in an unusual 
opinion issued on the denial of defendant's request for 
rehearing, the court expressly disapproved of its own citation to 
Babcock in the earlier Care Construction decision. 64 The 
conflict in the courts of appeal regarding the proper 
interpretation of section 1717 set the stage for a resolution of 
the problem by the California Supreme Court. 
IV. REYNOWS V. ALPERSON AND ITS PROGENY 
In the landmark case of Reynolds Metals Co. v. Aiperson,65 
the California Supreme Court put to rest the question whether 
a nonsignatory to a contract may recover attorneys' fees when 
the nonsignatory is sued on the contract as if he or she were a 
party to it, and the contract contains an attorneys' fees 
provision. 66 In Reynolds, plaintiff was the supplier of 
aluminum goods to a metal-supply company, Turner Metals.67 
Turner Metals, a wholly owned subsidiary of TMI, Inc., 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. The Canal-Randolph court could not seem to get over the apparent 
contradiction resulting from a literal interpretation of section 1717: "If 'the 
unsuccessful party to such litigation' is interpreted as referring to a person not a party 
to the lease, an absurdity results; the parties to the lease would be attempting to bind a 
person not a party to the lease to pay attorney fees." Id. at 475-76. 
65 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 599 P.2d 83 (Cal. 1979). 
66 Id. at 85. 
67 Id. at 84. 
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purchased several hundred thousand dollars' worth of 
aluminum goods from plaintiff on credit. 68 In the course of 
their dealings, plaintiff obtained from the supply company two 
promissory notes that contained attorneys' fees provisions. 69 
When Turner Metals became insolvent and filed for 
bankruptcy, plaintiff filed a lawsuit, attempting to hold the 
shareholders and directors of TMI, Inc., responsible for the 
debts owed by Turner Metals on an alter ego theory of 
liability. 70 After a bench trial, the trial court found that 
plaintiffs had failed to prove their case and granted judgment 
for defendants.71 Defendants moved the court for an award of 
attorneys' fees based on the attorneys' fees provisions 
contained in the promissory notes, to which defendants were 
not parties. 72 The trial court granted defendants' motion.73 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reviewed the 
purpose of section 1717 and concluded that a nonsignatory who 
successfully defends against a breach-of-contract action may 
recover his or her attorneys' fees pursuant to a fee provision in 
the contract, despite the fact that he or she was not a party to 
the contract. 74 Relying on Babcock v. Omansky, the Aiperson 
Court reasoned that 
[h]ad plaintiff prevailed on its cause of action claiming 
defendants were in fact the alter egos of the corporation, 
defendants would have been liable on the notes. Since they 
would have been liable for attorney's fees pursuant to the 
fees provision had plaintiff prevailed, they may recover 
attorney's fees pursuant to section 1717 now that they have 
'1 d 75 preVaI e . 
Subsequently, in cases applying the rule of Reynolds, the 
courts were careful to emphasize that the award of attorneys' 
fees to a non signatory had its roots in the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel. For example, in Jones v. Drain76 defendants entered 
6a Id. 
69 Id. 
70 I d. 
71 Reynolds Metals, 599 P.2d at 84. 
72 I d. 
73 I d. 
74 I d. at 86. 
75 Id. (citation omitted). 
76 Jones v. Drain, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830 (Ct. App. 1983). 
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into an exclusive real estate listing agreement with Sears 
Realty for the sale of their home.77 Sears Realty entered into 
an oral agreement with another broker, Bob Jones Realty, for 
real estate broker services in connection with the sale of 
defendants' home.78 Bob Jones Realty found a buyer for 
defendants' home, but defendants refused to sell because of a 
potential adverse tax consequence.79 Defendants thereafter 
entered into an agreement to sell their home to a third party.80 
In the meantime, Bob Jones Realty had found another buyer 
for the home.81 Defendants refused to sell to the new buyer 
because they had previously entered into an agreement to sell 
their home.82 
Bob Jones Realty filed suit against defendants, alleging 
several causes of action for breach of the listing agreement. 
The listing agreement contained an attorneys' fees provision. 
Defendants prevailed on all causes of action, but the trial court 
denied their request for attorneys' fees on the ground that no 
contract existed between the parties.83 However, the court of 
appeal reversed the trial court's order denying defendants' 
attorneys' fees. The court observed that section 1717 on its 
face requires an award of attorneys' fees to a nonsignatory, and 
that the cases holding to the contrary84 run afoul of the rule 
announced in Babcock and Reynolds.85 Furthermore, the Jones 
court explicitly held that, in determining whether an attorneys' 
fees award should be made, the courts should look to the 
pleadings to determine whether the non signatory was exposed 
to an attorneys' fees award:86 
The courts have consistently held that the award of Civil 
Code section 1717 contractual attorney's fees is to be 
governed by equitable principles. We believe that it is 
extraordinarily inequitable to deny a party who successfully 
77 Id. at 828. 
78 Id. 
79 I d. 
8o Id. 
81 I d. 
82 Jones, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 828. 
83 I d. 
84 See Star Pac. Invs., Inc. v. Oro Hills Ranch, Inc., 176 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Ct. App. 
1981); Boliver v. Surety Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1977). 
85 Jones, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 830. 
86 Id. at 829-30. 
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defends an action on a contract, which claims attorney's fees, 
the right to recover its attorney's fees and costs simply 
because the party initiating the case has filed a frivolous 
lawsuit. As a consequence, we fmd that a prevailing 
defendant sued for breach of contract containing an 
attorney's fees provision and having had to defend the 
contract cause of action is entitled to recover its own 
attorney's fees and costs therefor, even though the trial court 
finds no contract existed.87 
Similarly, in Manier v. Anaheim Business Center CO.,88 a 
case decided shortly after Jones, plaintiff executed a real-estate 
purchase agreement for commercial property owned by 
defendants.89 Plaintiff failed to obtain necessary financing for 
the purchase, and defendants canceled the agreement.90 
Plaintiff sued defendants for specific performance and breach 
of contract, claiming that defendants had promised to assist 
plaintiff in obtaining financing. 91 The trial court found that 
defendants had made no such promise and ruled in defendants' 
favor.92 Defendants then moved the court for an award of 
attorneys' fees. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled 
that no contract existed between the parties because 
defendants had inserted a handwritten note on the bottom of 
the agreement that plaintiff had not initialed.93 The trial court 
treated the handwritten note as a counteroffer to which 
plaintiff had not agreed, and concluded that there was no 
contract on which an award of attorneys' fees could be based.94 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that 
"[t]he existence of an enforceable agreement is not a 
prerequisite to an award of attorneys fees under Civil Code 
section 1717. That section is available even where the 
prevailing party succeeds on the theory there was never an 
enforceable contract.,,95 The Manier court also rejected 
plaintiffs' argument that because they were not entitled to an 
87 Id. at 489-90 (citations omitted). 
88 Manier v. Anaheim Bus. Ctr. Co., 207 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Ct. App. 1984). 
89 Id. at 509. 
90 I d. 
91 I d. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Manier, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 509. 
95 Id. at 509-10. 
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award of attorneys' fees if they had prevailed, defendants were 
foreclosed from recovering their attorneys' fees. 96 Plaintiff 
"would have been entitled to attorneys fees if their complaint 
had merit, which it concededly did not. »97 
Under Reynolds and its progeny, the basis for attorneys' 
fees awards under section 1717 became firmly rooted in the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Subsequently, the equitable 
estoppel doctrine was eroded in an erroneous court of appeal 
decision that introduced substantial confusion into this area of 
the law. 
V. LEACH V. HOME SA VINGS & LOAN AsS N 
The first court of appeal decision after Reynolds to reject 
the doctrine of estoppel as a basis for an award of attorneys' 
fees to a non signatory was Leach v. Home Savings & Loan 
Assn.98 In Leach, plaintiff was the beneficiary of a 
testamentary trust established upon the death of her mother.99 
The trust res consisted of a residence and some cash.loo 
Plaintiff's brother, the trustee of the testamentary trust, 
borrowed $33,600 from a bank, signed a promissory note, and 
secured the loan with a deed of trust on the trust residence. lol 
Plaintiff's brother subsequently borrowed another $42,000 from 
a third party, securing the loan with another promissory note 
and second trust deed on the trust residence. lo2 At some point 
in time, plaintiff became aware that her brother had repeatedly 
96 Id. at 511. 
97 Id. Plaintiffs wife also argued that, because she did not sign the real estate 
purchase agreement, she could not be held liable for attorneys' fees under its attorneys' 
fees provision. The Manier court had no difficulty disposing of this argument. 
"Finally, it is of no moment that Marne Manier was not a signatory to the deposit 
receipt; she alleged entitlement to attorneys fees under it." Id. at 511-12 (citing Jones 
v. Drain, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 831 (Ct. App. 1983». 
98 Leach v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 230 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Ct. App. 1986). At least 
two other court of appeal decisions have criticized Manier and Jones on the grounds 
that both of those decisions relied on a discredited estoppel theory to support their 
award of attorneys' fees to a nonsignatory to a contract. See Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. 
Wang, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Ct. App. 1993); Myers Bldg. Indus., Ltd. v. Interface Tech., 
Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 250 n.12 (Ct. App. 1993). But cf. Real Prop. Servs. Corp. v. 
City of Pasadena, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Manier and Jones with 
approval). 
99 Leach, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 555. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 555-56. 
102 I d. 
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mortgaged the trust residence without notifYing her, in spite of 
the fact that he had been discharged as trustee. l03 Plaintiff 
filed an action to quiet title by having the various deeds of trust 
declared invalid. l04 Plaintiff contended that the various lending 
institutions that had made loans to her brother knew that he 
was acting without authority, because they had actual and 
constructive notice that he had been discharged as trustee. l05 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of 
affidavits that showed they had no knowledge that plaintiffs 
brother had been discharged as trustee. l06 The trial court 
granted the motions for summary judgment, holding that 
defendants had proved that they had no actual knowledge that 
plaintiffs brother had been discharged as trustee. l07 
Subsequently, the first and second trust-deed holders each 
moved the court for an award of attorneys' fees. l08 The trial 
court denied both of these motions. l09 
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Leach 
court, without any apparent need to do so, issued a broad 
holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was not the 
basis for an attorneys' fees award under section 1717.110 
According to the Leach court, the "equitable estoppel theory 
was first announced in Pas v. Hill, a case that was criticized by 
legal writers and later overruled by the Pas court itself in 
Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Assn. As such, Jones and 
Manier are not well-founded."111 
A close reading of Pas and Saucedo, however, reveals that 
these cases were entirely misread by the Leach court. 
Contrary to the Leach court's observation that the equitable 
estoppel theory was first "announced" in Pas, the Pas court did 
103 Id. at 556. 
104 Id. 
105 Leach, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 556. 
106 I d. 
107 I d. 
106 Id. 
109 Id. 
llO There is no indication in Leach that plaintiff requested an award of attorneys' 
fees in her complaint. A cryptic reference to "Leach's bare allegation that she is 
entitled to receive attorney's fees" appears to be a hypothetical statement intended to 
respond to an argument raised by defendants' counsel. Id. at 56!. 
111 Id. (citations omitted); see also Pilcher v. Wheeler, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533, 536 (Ct. 
App. 1992); Alhambra Redevelopment Agency v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 261 Cal. 
Rptr. 248, 253-54 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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not rely on equitable estoppel to reach its holding. In Pas, the 
court held that no attorneys' fees were recoverable by plaintiff 
because defendants, in their countersuit, were not attempting 
to establish plaintiffs liability under a promissory note, which 
would have made attorneys' fees recoverable under the 
reciprocity provisions of section 1717.l12 Rather, defendants in 
Pas "were seeking to sell the property at a trustee's sale 
pursuant to the deed of trust encumbering the property."l13 
Under these circumstances, "neither fairness nor the legislative 
purpose behind Civil Code section 1717 requires that plaintiffs 
be permitted to recover attorney fees from defendants."l14 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Pas court did not rely on the 
doctrine of estoppel. The Pas court only mentioned the 
estoppel doctrine in dictum to explain the court's holding in 
Babcock v. Omansky.1l5 
Subsequently, in Saucedo, plaintiffs argued on appeal that 
they should have been permitted to recover their attorneys' 
fees "under the equitable estoppel theory suggested in Pas v. 
Hill.,,1l6 In response to this argument, the Saucedo court 
recognized the viability of the estoppel argument but declined 
to adopt it as the basis of its ruling: 
While plaintiffs' right to recover attorney fees might 
conceivably be established on that basis [equitable estoppel], 
our reanalysis of the problem leads us to the conclusion that 
our denial of the recovery of attorney fees in Pas v. 1hl1 was 
in error, and we think it preferable to deal with the problem 
head on, rather than obliquely by adopting another theory.l17 
The Saucedo court then went on to revisit the conclusion 
reached in Pas. that persons seeking to sell a property at a 
trustee's sale, pursuant to a deed of trust, cannot recover their 
attorneys' fees. l1S The Saucedo court held that this conclusion 
was in error, based on "the real relationship between a 
112 Pas v. Hill, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98, 108 (Ct. App. 1978). 
113 Id. (citations omitted). It was this conclusion that the Saucedo court sought to 
revisit when it addressed the issue of attorneys' fees in that case. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Saucedo v. Mercury Say. & Loan Ass'n, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552, 554 (Ct. App. 
1980). 
117 Id. at 554-55 (footnote omitted). 
liS Id. 
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nonassuming grantee and the trust deed holder.,,119 The court 
in Saucedo held that attorneys' fees should be recoverable in 
such a situation because "as a practical matter, on foreclosure 
the beneficiary is entitled to recover its fees as a condition to 
redemption.,,12o 
Even though Saucedo effectively overruled Pas, it did not 
do so on the basis that equitable estoppel was an untenable 
theory to support an award of attorneys' fees. 121 Indeed, the 
Pas case itself was cited with approval by the California 
Supreme Court one year after it decided Reynolds,122 which 
established the principle that awards of attorneys' fees are to 
be "governed by equitable principles."123 Therefore Manier and 
Jones retain their vitality as precedent to the extent that their 
holdings were based on equitable principles. 124 
VI. POST-LEACHCONFUSION AND THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL 
Instead of critically analyzing the court's holding in Leach, 
several courts have simply accepted its holding and rejected 
the argument that an award of attorneys' fees to 
nonsignatories should be based on the doctrine of estoppel. 125 
For example, in Super 7 Motel Associates v. Wang, a purchaser 
of real property sued the seller and the seller's broker for 
failing to disclose certain facts about the property. 126 The 
gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was fraud, and plaintiff 
sought rescission or, alternatively, tort damages based on 
fraud. 127 Plaintiff prevailed against the seller but failed to 
prove his case against the broker. 128 The broker thereafter 
requested an award of attorneys' fees, which the trial court 
119 [d. at 555.56. 
120 [d. 
121 See Wilhite v. Callihan, 185 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219 (Ct. App. 1982). 
122 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 599 P.2d 83, 86 (Cal. 1979). 
123 [d. 
124 Montgomery v. Bio-Med Specialties, Inc., 228 Cal. Rptr. 709, 710 (Ct. App. 
1986). 
125 See, e.g., Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Ct. App. 1993); 
Myers Bldg. Indus., Ltd. v. Interface Tech., Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 250 n.12 (Ct. 
App. 1993); Alhambra Redevelopment Agency v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 261 Cal. 
Rptr. 248, 253-54 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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granted. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding 
that the broker was not a party to the portion of the real estate 
purchase agreement that contained an attorneys' fees clause 
covering disputes between the buyer and seller.129 The broker 
argued, however, that if he was not considered a party to the 
real estate purchase agreement, he was nevertheless entitled 
to an award of fees under estoppel principles because he had 
been sued as a party to the agreement.130 The court rejected 
this argument on the basis of Leach: 
Thus, contrary to [the broker's] contention, Reynolds and 
similar cases do not rely on estoppel. ... More importantly, 
Leach explained that "estoppel" is inconsistent with the 
Reynolds requirement that the nonsignatory show the 
plaintiff would actually have been entitled to fees. 131 
In Myers Building Industn'es, Ltd. v. Interface Technology, 
Inc./32 the Second District Court of Appeal, in dictum, stated 
that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to an award of 
attorneys' fees based on a unilateral attorneys' fees provision in 
a construction contract. The court reasoned that this was 
because the "mere allegation of a contractual right to attorney 
fees is not sufficient to create an estoppel where [defendant] 
would not actually have been entitled to attorney fees under 
the contract if [defendant] had prevailed.,,133 In the view of the 
Myers court, both Manier and Jones were "disapproved" in 
Leach. 134 Neither the Super 7 court nor the Myers court looked 
to see whether Leach's conclusion that the doctrine of estoppel 
had been discredited was correct. 135 
In more recent decisions, courts have been similarly 
reluctant to reexamine the basis of the holding in Leach. 136 
1993). 
129 Id. at 198. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 199 (footnote and citations omitted). 
132 Myers Bldg. Indus., Ltd. v. Interface Tech., Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242 (Ct. App. 
133 Id. at 250 n.12. 
134 Id. 
135 In an attempt to harmonize Leach with Jones and Manier, the court in Real 
Property Services Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (Ct. App. 1994) stated 
that in both Jones and Manier, "the nonsignatory plaintiffs would have been entitled to 
attorney's fees ifthey had prevailed in the action on the contract." Id. at 541 n.5. 
136 See Cal. Wholesale Material Supply, Inc. v. Norm Wilson & Sons, Inc., 117 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 396-97 (Ct. App. 2002); Sessions Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Noble 
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However, one court has explicitly rejected it. In International 
Bl1ling Services, Inc. v. Emigh,137 the Third District Court of 
Appeal squarely addressed the Leach court's rejection of the 
estoppel theory and concluded that "[t]his makes little sense .. 
. . The point of an estoppel is to prevent a party from litigating 
an issue: Estoppel is not dependent on the potential merits of a 
claim but depends on the manner in which a claim is raised or 
not raised."138 Clearly disturbed by the prospect of overreaching 
in litigation, the Emigh court stated flatly that "[t]he purposes 
of section 1717 are thwarted when a party is able to use the 
threat of fees as a club, and seek to avoid liability for fees 
later. ,,139 
The view taken by the Emigh court has not been favorably 
received. Recently, in Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown 
Sunnyvale, LLG, the Sixth District Court of Appeal conducted a 
comprehensive survey of the case law interpreting section 
1717.140 The court observed that contract awards to 
nonsignatories based on an equitable estoppel theory have been 
"repeatedly criticized and rejected" and that several other 
courts have joined Leach "in rejecting estoppel as a basis for 
awarding attorney fees against a losing nonsignatory."141 The 
court acknowledged that "the estoppel view, or its equivalent, 
has also been repeatedly, if perplexingly and sometimes 
equivocally, resurrected,,142 and proceeded to deliver a scathing 
critique of Emigh: 
In [Emigh], the court opined that rejecting estoppel while 
adhering to contract language "ma[de] little sense" because, 
as the court offered interrogatively, "Why would any party 
Constr. Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 134 (Ct. App. 2000). But see Loduca v. Polyzos, 62 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 780, 784-87 (Ct. App. 2007); M. Perez Co. v. Base Camp Condos. Ass'n 
No. One, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 570 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[Elven where the contract does not 
contain an attorney fee provision, if a party claims that it does and loses the case, it 
will be required to pay the prevailing party's attorney fees. However, we emphasized 
that this rule 'applies only where a party brings a breach of contract action and the 
contract contains some provision which the party asserts operates as a fees provision.'" 
(quoting Int'l Billing Servs., Inc. v. Emigh, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 540 (Ct. App. 2000))). 
137 Int'l Billing Servs., Inc. v. Emigh, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Ct. App. 2000). 
138 Id. at 54!. 
139 Id. at 539. 
140 Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 
353-60 (Ct. App. 2008). 
141 I d. at 356-57. 
142 I d. at 357. 
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need to estop another party, where the provision actually-
clearly-provided for fees?" We answer this question with one 
of our own: Why would a court predicate a holding, let alone 
a rule of law, on a party's "need[sl?" As the court there 
acknowledged, equitable estoppel generally "entails 
detrimental reliance" by one party on the words or conduct of 
the other. Merely praying for relief to which one is not 
entitled cannot ordinarily engender either reliance or 
detriment .... To visit a losing claimant's own demands upon 
him might appeal to a sense of playground justice, but it has 
no basis in our law .... We know of nothing in our law that 
justifies awarding such fees to a party merely because his 
opponent asked for them. 143 
35 
The Blickman court's statement that a prayer for relief 
cannot create reliance or detriment is surprising. It may well 
be that, in modern times, litigation is pursued with such ease 
and frequency that the courts have acquired a false impression 
that no one is harmed by the filing of a complaint. 
Nevertheless, defendants who become embroiled in litigation -
particularly nonsignatories who are not parties to the disputed 
contract - do suffer harm from a prayer for relief against 
them, compounded by a request for attorneys' fees. Such harm 
may result in an unfair settlement to which the claiming party 
has no right under the law. 
Moreover, the Blickman court's statements ignore the 
equitable tenets underpinning section 1717 and the coercive 
effect of uncertainty when a request for attorneys' fees is made. 
As noted by the Emigh court: "'For section 1717 to function as 
intended, parties need reasonable prospective assurance of 
whether they will or will not be able to recover their attorney's 
fees if they win, and whether they will have to pay their 
opponent's fees if they lose.' ... The in terrorem effect of 
uncertainty should not be underestimated."144 
143 Id. at 357-58 (citations omitted). The Blickman court could not understand 
how it was unfair to allow a litigant to threaten a nonsignatory with an adverse 
attorneys' fees award and avoid "the same fate if unsuccessful." Id. at 357. "But this 
happens every time a party prays for relief to which he is ultimately held not to be 
entitled. Thus it might be said with equal justice that a plaintiff who prays for 
$100,000 in damages to which he was not entitled acted 'unfair[lyl' by'threatenlingl' 
his opponent with the prospect of an adverse award. Yet no one would suggest that 
this entitles the defendant to a judgment for $100,000." Id. 
144 Emigh, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541 (internal citations omitted). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the courts continue to recognize that the 
contractual exception to the "American Rule" has its basis in 
equitable considerations, they largely have abandoned the 
equitable doctrine of estoppel when dealing with attorneys' fees 
awards to nonsignatories. Nevertheless, parties who are sued 
as if they are signatories to a contract, who are required to 
defend such actions at great cost, and who have successfully 
defended such actions, should not be turned away when they 
seek to recover their attorneys' fees. The doctrine of estoppel, 
although disapproved by some courts, still remains a viable 
basis on which to assert claims for such awards. 145 As a matter 
of fundamental fairness to non signatories who have been 
improperly sued as if they were parties to a contract,146 a 
legislative amendment to clarifY the equitable basis of the 
statute should be enacted. 
145 See, e.g., M. Perez Co. v. Base Camp Condos. Ass'n No. One, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
563,569-70 (Ct. App. 2003); Emigh, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539-43. 
146 Cf. Moallem v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 256 
(Ct. App. 1994) ("Moallem's position sounds a strong call of fairness. The same policy 
considerations that underlie section 1717's provision for attorney fees for the prevailing 
party in a contract action . . . would appear to warrant such a reciprocal allowance 
when the contract provides for fees not only 'incurred to enforce that contract' but also 
on account of litigation, as here, 'relating to' it. But this is a judgment that is not ours 
to implement. In section 1717, the Legislature has prescribed with clarity that the 
public policy Moallem seeks to invoke presently applies only to attorney fees for 
contract actions, not tort claims." (internal citations omitted». 
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